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Introduction
Immanuel Kant first recognized that a republican form of
government, one that is founded on the principles of liberty, dependence
on a single common legislative body, and equality among members of
society, is more peaceful than other forms of government.1 Kant's
theories were largely ignored because the number of democracies
worldwide made statistical analysis relatively insignificant. After World
War II, as democracies flourished, scholars picked up on the idea of a
correlation between government structure and a nation's tendencies
towards war.
The earliest of these scholars sought to prove that democracies do
not enter into major wars with one another.2 Numerous others undertook

1.

Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, in ETERNAL PEACE AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL

ESSAYS 76-78 *W. Hastie trans., World Peace Foundation, 1914) (1795).
2. See, e.g., Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-
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statistical analysis to prove this hypothesis, and concluded that since the
early 1800s, no democracies have fought each other in a major
international war.3 This fundamental concept came to be known as the
"democratic peace." As this proposition gained acceptance,4 other
scholars expanded on this research, finding that democracies were not
violent toward each other.5 Where democracies are found to dispute one
another, one party or both is likely to have recently transitioned to
democratic, is subject to violent domestic challenge,
or is toward the
6
center of a democratic to non-democratic continuum.
By the early 1990s, research focused on determining which facets of
democracies might explain why the correlation between government
structure and aggression is so strong.7 In other words, scholars shifted
their attention from the question of whether democracies fight each other
to the question of why they do not.8
The bulk of the research to date has focused on democracies' levels
of aggression toward one another.
Many scholars believe that
democracies are just as war-prone as other regimes, but not towards each
other. 9 A few scholars have undertaken an analysis of this hypothesis
and found to the contrary that democracies have demonstrated less
violence overall (in terms of degree of violence rather than frequency of
violence), not just towards one another. 10 Further, democracies are less
likely than non-democracies to escalate a conflict to war."
Along these same lines, some scholars have found evidence that
democratic states are difficult to defeat. 12 In fact, democracies tend to
Cold War World 1-16 (1993) [hereinafter Russett, Principles]; Zeev Maoz & Nasrin
Abdolali, Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976, 33 J. of Conflict Resol.
3-35 (1989); Spencer Weart, Peace Among Democratic and OligarchicRepublics, 31 J.
of Peace Res. 299-316 (1994).
3. John Norton Moore, Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle 3132 (Sept. 2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (citing R. J. RUMMEL,
POWER KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVIOLENCE 25-49 (1997)).
4. Evidence of its acceptance can be gleaned from the comprehensive histories of
the democratic peace proposition compiled by James Lee Ray and R.J. Rummel. JAMES
LEE RAY, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: AN EVALUATION OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PEACE PROPOSITION 1-46 (reprint 1998) (1995); R. J. RUMMEL, POWER
KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVIOLENCE 25-45 (1997).

5. RUMMEL, supra note 4, at 29.
6. RUSSETT, PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 38.
7.

See, e.g.,
Bruce Russett, The Democratic Peace: "And Yet It Moves,"

19 INT'L SECURITY 164 (1995); David Leblang & Steve Chan, Explaining Wars Fought
by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter?, at
http://sobek.colorado.edu/-leblang/demwar.doc (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
8. RUMMEL, supra note 4, at 36.
9. See RUMMEL, supra note 4, at 63-64. See also RAY, supra note 4, at 32-35.
10. See id. at 79-80. See also RAY, supra note 4, at 27-38.
11. RAY, supranote 4, at 37-39.
12. Id.at8.
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win more frequently than other forms of government. 13 One might draw
the conclusion that democracies engage in wars that they believe they
will likely win. If true, this may be a distinction in the current-day
United States' ("U.S.") treatment of Iraq versus its treatment of North
Korea. Because Iraq is not yet a nuclear power, the U.S. has a significant
military advantage in any conflict with Iraq. North Korea, however,
already possesses nuclear weapons, which makes the U.S. military
advantage significantly less than its advantage over Iraq. Thus, it makes
more sense for the U.S. to pursue diplomatic resolution with North
Korea, while it feels freer to pursue military resolution in conflict with
Iraq.
We now have overwhelming evidence that democracies are less
war-prone and indeed less violent than non-democracies, but merely
knowing this fact does not provide us with a framework for using this
new-found knowledge to promote world peace.
We know that
democracies are less prone to violence, but we also know that they do
engage in some conflicts. Focusing on the frequencies of wars engaged
in by democracies and the level of violence attained, some studies have
attempted to identify why democracies avoid wars and minimize the
degree of violence. Increasingly, scholars have sought to identify why
democracies become involved in the conflicts in which they do
participate.
One of the scholars involved in this line of research is Professor J.
N. Moore. In a recent study, Moore indicated that since the United
Nations Charter ("UN Charter" or "Charter") was implemented, "clear
aggression by a democratic government in a major interstate war setting
has been limited to a single instance out of approximately twenty-eight
major wars."' 14 Additionally, even in those cases marginally arguable as
instances of democratic aggression, 15 none of the post-Charter interstate
wars was motivated by democratic nation value extension as opposed to
16
value conservation.
13. See, e.g., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Randolph M. Siverson, War and the
Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political
Accountability, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 841, 852 (1995); DAN REITER & ALLEN C. STAM,
DEMOCRACIES AT WAR 22-23 (2002); Leblang & Chan, supra note 7, at 2.

14. Moore, supra note 3, at 31-32. The one instance of democratic aggression was
the Suez War in 1956, in which the UK, France and Israel jointly attacked Egypt in
response to its attempts to nationalize the Suez Canal. Id.
15. Id at 33. According to Professor Moore's study, the 1971 Bangladesh War and
the actions of Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus intervention are arguable cases of democratic
aggression. Id. However, the former could be justified as humanitarian intervention and
the latter was in response to a coup against the Government of Cyprus and could be
considered collective defense.
16. Actions motivated by value conservation are those actions taken to prevent the
coercive unilateral modification of major value systems. To objectively classify each
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At the same time, evidence indicates that the more unstable the
country, the more likely democracies were to intervene. 17 Whether this
is because democracies are hoping to instill democratic values in a new
regime or not remains to be seen.
The majority of work to date on the democratic peace has focused
on major interstate wars involving greater than one thousand battle
deaths.1 8 This cutoff point is used to eliminate those instances of
violence attributable to accidents, unauthorized incursions, limited
military actions designed for deterrence, and military actions by a strong
military against a weaker adversary not anticipated to resist.' 9 While this
distinction was useful for early research on the democratic peace
proposition, in order to fully understand the ramifications of government
structure on levels of violence and aggression, we must also understand
the democratic peace proposition as it applies to smaller war settings.
Admittedly, some scholars have examined democracies' tendencies
toward violence using militarized interstate disputes rather than major
interstate wars. But these scholars have not gone so far as to identify
why democracies became involved in the conflicts in which they did.
Acknowledging this gap in research, I have analyzed small international
wars with this purpose in mind. In attempting to manage the scope of
this article, I opted to focus on small wars involving the U.S. since its
inception. By doing so, I have ensured the integrity of the democratic
participant component in each of the conflicts analyzed. While this data
set does not lend itself to comparison of involvement by democracies and
non-democracies in small wars, it does lend itself to analysis of why and
how democracies have become involved in the small wars in which they
did participate, providing one accepts the underlying assumption that the
U.S. is representative of democracies in general.
This paper is organized around three distinct data sets: interstate
conflicts, civil conflicts, and interventions for protection. Each data set
contains information on small wars in which the U.S. participated in
some form or fashion. I have defined "small wars" loosely, to include
interstate conflicts with less than 1,000 total battle deaths. I included
civil conflicts and interventions for protection even where total battle
deaths may have been greater than 1,000, but where U.S. participation
did not involve a significant number of battle deaths.
"Interstate conflicts" are conflicts in which opposing belligerents
are both State governments.
I have broadly interpreted "State
action in one of two mutually exclusive categories, actions motivated by value extension
include all actions not motivated by value conservation.
17.

Cf MAx BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE 157 (2002).

18.
19.

RUSSETT, PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 12.
Id.

2003]

DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION: U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SMALL WARS

317

government" to include tribal governments where no other organized
form of government existed. This category includes conflicts that were
interstate in nature prior to U.S. involvement, or that are two-party
conflicts (e.g. the U.S. against the government of another country).
While several of the conflicts in this category could also be placed in the
"civil conflicts" category, I have chosen to include as "interstate
conflicts" all incidents where motivation for U.S. involvement was based
on an actual or perceived wrongdoing directed by the opposing State
against the U.S.
"Civil conflicts" are conflicts that were primarily domestic in nature
prior to U.S. involvement, but became interstate in nature by virtue of
U.S. involvement.
These conflicts are struggles for control of
government structure by competing factions located within the State.
Unlike the interstate conflicts, opposing belligerents are not both State
governments, and often it is difficult to determine which side represents
the existing State government. In all cases in this category, the U.S.
military actively engaged in the conflict. Usually, the U.S. fought on the
side of one belligerent or another, though sometimes it remained neutral
to the outcome. More often than not, the U.S. remained involved in the
rebuilding of government structure following the end of the conflict.
Finally, "interventions for protection" are conflicts in which the
U.S. sent troops not to engage in the conflict on the side of one
belligerent or another, but rather to serve as a deterrent to a hostile attack
against U.S. nationals and property or to evacuate U.S. nationals from a
zone of conflict. At all times, the U.S. troops remained neutral and
avoided the use of force except when necessary for self-defense.
Summary of the Findings
After analysis of thirty-two interstate conflicts and eighteen civil
conflicts in which the U.S. actively engaged, as well as eighty-eight
interventions for protection, the following conclusions can be drawn:
" Throughout its history, the U.S. has neither threatened nor used
force against another democracy in a small war setting.
* The U.S. was more than twice as likely to be the object of
aggression in small interstate conflicts than it was to be the aggressor.
- When the U.S. was the aggressor in several small interstate
conflicts, it was significantly more likely to be motivated by value
conservation than by value extension.
- In small interstate conflicts, non-democracies were as likely to
commit aggression for purposes of value extension as for purposes of
value conservation.
* While on numerous occasions the U.S. actions would have been
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considered to be illegal according to post-Charter international standards,
most of the actions woufd have been legal under customary international
law at the time of the occurrence.
- In each of the small interstate conflicts in which the U.S. became
engaged, the U.S. was acting against an actual or perceived wrongdoing
by the other State.
- Where the U.S. acted illegally according to modem standards, it
was unlikely that the conflict would escalate to war.
- In civil conflicts, the U.S. was just as likely to intervene in a
manner inconsistent with modem legal standards as it was to intervene
legally.
- The U.S. was more likely to intervene in a civil conflict in
countries in which the government was in turmoil than in countries with
an established government.
- Throughout history, the U.S. has been far more likely to send
forces when it did not anticipate armed aggression than when it did
anticipate armed aggression.
These findings support and expand upon the general democratic
peace proposition that democracies do not engage in armed conflict
(whether the war is major or minor) against one another. They also
support the proposition that democracies are less violent overall, but
without comparison to the levels of violence attributed to nondemocracies. The U.S. was most likely to engage in conflicts in which it
believed the use of armed force could be kept to a minimum. While the
data also support the theory that democracies are less aggressive than are
non-democracies, they also provide evidence for the proposition that
democracies are more aggressive in small war settings than in major
interstate conflicts. This is especially apparent in light of the frequency
with which the U.S. has intervened in the civil conflicts of another State
with seeming disregard to the legality of the intervention. These findings
will be discussed in greater detail below.
The Data Sets
In my analysis of small international wars, I have divided the data
into three categories: interstate conflicts, civil conflicts (which are
nevertheless international by virtue of U.S. intervention), and
interventions for protection. Each category remains focused on small
wars, which I have defined as international military disputes involving
fewer than 1,000 battle deaths. This definition excludes peaceful
landings, covert action, disaster relief, terrorist acts, transportation of
military personnel or supplies, and actions in conjunction with drug
trafficking. It also excludes some minor conflicts that are more properly
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thought of as extensions of, or precursors to, a major interstate war, but
which occurred outside the official dates of the major conflict. Rather
than embarking upon an exhaustive study of small international wars, I
limited the scope of my analysis to include only those small wars in
which the U.S. was a participant abroad. Excluded from this analysis are
conflicts on land that ultimately became part of the continental United
States. While analysis of these conflicts would certainly be a useful and
interesting exercise, I believe such analysis of conflicts over contested
land and boundary disputes would skew the data otherwise dedicated to
purely international settings.
Data sets for each category can be found in the Appendices.
Interstate Conflicts
The data set for this category includes:
" The year(s) of the conflict;
• A brief description of the conflict;
• An identification of the State(s) in opposition to the U.S. during
the conflict;
- The regime category of the State(s) opposing the U.S. during the
year(s) of the conflict, according to the Polity IV data set;
- The regime category of the U.S. during the year(s) of the conflict,
according to the Polity IV 20 data set;
* An identification, where applicable, of which party was the
aggressor;
• An indication of whether the aggressor acted for value extension
or value conservation; and
- A determination of whether each party's actions were legal
according to post-Charter standards of international law.
Basic conflict information (the dates of the conflict, a description of
the conflict, the parties involved) was derived from a Congressional
Research Service (CRS) Report on the use of U.S. armed forces abroad.2'
That report summarizes hundreds of instances in which the U.S. sent
troops abroad, beginning in 1798 and running through 1999. From that
list, I determined which instances met my narrower definition of small
interstate wars.
In compiling this data, I also consulted with the Militarized
Interstate Dispute data set available through the Correlates of War

20. See POLITY IV PROJECT, infra note 23.
21. Richard F. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad,
1798-1999, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress (May 17, 1999),
available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30172.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
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project.22 The Correlates of War project recently revised the Militarized
Interstate Dispute data, but the updated version was not available when I
commenced my research.23 The older data set largely corresponded with
the CRS Report, but alone did not provide sufficient information on each
militarized interstate dispute to allow for a more thorough analysis of
each conflict.
Having identified the conflicts and the parties involved in each
conflict, I used the Polity IV data set 24 to characterize each regime. The
Polity IV data set is the latest update from the continuing Polity Project,
which collects data about regime and authority characteristics from 1800
to 1999, in order to assess the degree of democracy or autocracy
represented in each country's government on a year-by-year basis. The
Polity data set only analyzes the regimes of independent states with total
populations of greater than 500,000,25 thus some smaller regimes or nonindependent regimes are not represented in the Polity data set, and are
therefore coded as "N/A" in my own data set.
The Polity Project identified three indicators of a democratic form
of government: the competitiveness of political participation, the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints
on the chief executive.26 Each government was analyzed using these
factors to come up with a polity score ranging from +10 (strongly
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).27
The data set next identifies which party was the aggressor in the
conflict at issue. In order to determine this, I used the definition of
aggression as set forth in the 1974 United Nations Resolution on the
Definition of Aggression (the "Definition of Aggression Resolution" or
"Resolution"). 28 That resolution defines aggression as "the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political

22.

Daniel M. Jones, et al., Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale,

Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns, 15 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 163 (1996),

available at http://www.umich.edu/-cowproj/dataset.html#MID (last visited Oct. 23,
2003).
23. The revised version is now available. See Correlates of War 2 Project, MID 3
Project (Program in Empirical International Relations, The Pennsylvania State
University), available at http://cow2.1a.psu.edu (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
24. MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, INTEGRATED NETWORK FOR SOCIETAL
CONFLICT RESEARCH

PROGRAM,

CENTER

FOR

INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT

AND

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, UNIV. OF MD., POLITY IV PROJECT (2002), available at

http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter U.N. Resolution].
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independence of another State. 29 I view this definition as imperfect, but
have opted to use it for reasons stated below.
The nature of this study is such that it requires retrospective analysis
of conflicts. Such retroactive analysis is not conducive to using the
Resolution's definition, especially when the conflict occurred prior to the
existence of the United Nations ("UN") and its Security Council. The
definition in the Resolution is designed to be a guideline for the Security
Council in determining the existence of an act of aggression.3 °
Additionally, the Resolution states that "the question whether an act of
aggression has been committed must be considered in the light of all the
circumstances of each particular case., 31 Thus, the definition is not
complete on its face, as other factors need to be considered.
In spite of its imperfection, I have opted to use this definition in my
analysis of the small war data for two reasons. First, the definition is
conservative when used as though it is complete on its face, because it
views the first use of armed force as prima facie evidence of an act of
aggression.3 2 Thus, the definition will identify the U.S. as more
aggressive in small wars than a judgment by the modem-day Security
Council may indicate after considering all the facts and circumstances.
Second, while the U.S. does not regard this definition as completely
authoritative, it agrees with the essential concepts utilized in the
Resolution's definition. 3
Finally, the data set identifies whether each belligerent's actions
were lawful during each conflict. In establishing whether a particular
action was legal, I looked to the current UN Charter framework in
conjunction with current customary international law and applied these
norms retroactively to the conflict at issue. Again, such retroactive
application of modem-day standards can create duplicity where the
action taken was legal under customary international law at the time
taken, but would not be legal if taken today. In the analysis that follows,
I have attempted to identify these duplicitous situations as applicable.
Because the Definition of Aggression Resolution characterizes an initial
aggression as illegal,34 every conflict in the data set will indicate at least
one illegal action. This is true even in instances where customary
international law may indicate that the initial act of aggression was not

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See id. Article 1.
U.N. Resolution, supra note 28.
See id.
See id. Article 2.
Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel, An Assessment of

International Legal Issues in Information Operations 14, May 1999, available at

http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/DOD-IO-legal.doc (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
34. U.N. Resolution, supra note 28.
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illegal. Frequently, the aggression was prompted by an illegal action by
the opposing State, or the opposing State responded in an unlawful
manner. In these instances, the data set will indicate that both parties
acted illegally.
Civil Conflicts
The data set for this category includes:
" The year(s) of the conflict;
" A brief description of the conflict;
" An identification of the opponent to the U.S. in the conflict;
" The regime category of the existing host government during the
year(s) of the conflict, according to the Polity IV data set;
- The regime category of the U.S. during the year(s) of the conflict,
according to the Polity IV data set;
" The status of the existing host government in terms of its stability;
" An indication whether the U.S. received an invitation or consent
to its actions within the host country; and
- A determination whether the U.S. involvement was legal.
Most of the information depicted in this data set is derived from the
same sources and using the same definitions as that used in the Interstate
Conflicts data set. Additional categories in this data set include the
status of the existing government and an indication of whether consent
was granted by the host country.
The status of the existing government is identified as being in one of
four conditions: established, equilibrium, factions or collapse. These
categories are suggested and used by Professor Wippman in his paper on
I have identified as "established" those
host-State consent. 35
governments in which the executive authority has clear control over
government structures. An "equilibrium" exists when the existing
government is being challenged such that a significant amount of control
over the country's land or its resources has been ceded to the challenger.
A government is considered to consist of "factions" when multiple
factions are vying for control of the country, and no one is clearly in
complete control. Finally, a country is considered in "collapse" once no
clear internal authority exists.
To determine the status of the existing government structure, and to
determine whether the host country offered consent to the interventions
in each conflict, I utilized the source data listed in Appendix B.

35.

David

Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations,and Host-State

Consent, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209

(1996).
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Interventionsfor Protection

The data set for this category includes:
- The year(s) of the conflict;
- A brief description of the conflict;
- The location of the conflict; and
- The regime category of the host country, according to the Polity
IV data set.
This information was compiled from the same sources and using the
same definitions as used in the Interstate Conflicts and Civil Conflicts
data sets.
Discussion of the Findings
Interstate Conflicts

The data set for interstate conflicts depicts a total of thirty-two
distinct interstate conflicts throughout U.S. history in which the U.S. was
involved as a belligerent. Of those, not a single one pitted the U.S.
against another democracy.
In order to validate this claim, the term "democracy" should be
clarified. The Polity IV database scores government regimes on a
continuum from autocracy (-10) to democracy (+10).36 This overall
score is determined after analysis of several component variables.37 One
presumes that a score greater than zero indicates that a government
regime is a democracy, and that a score less than zero indicates an
autocracy. Such a presumption deserves closer analysis.
The leading scholars on the democratic peace proposition have
identified the following characteristics as inherent in democracies: the
right to vote for a substantial fraction of citizens, contested elections, an
executive popularly elected or responsible to an elected legislature, and
some minimum level of civil liberties. 38 Fair and competitive elections
seem to be a common theme. 39 The component variable in the Polity IV
score that measures the competitiveness of elections is referred to as
40
"XRCOMP.,,
An "XRCOMP" score of "3" indicates that executives
are chosen through competitive elections. Thus, in the analysis that
follows, a "democracy" is considered to be a regime with an overall
36.
37.

MARSHALL & JAGGERS, supra note 24.

Id.

38. RUSSETT, PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 14. Cf RAY, supra note 4, at 1-2;
RUMMEL, supra note 4, at 40.
39. RUSSETr, PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 14. Cf RAY, supra note 4 at 2; RUMMEL,
supra note 4, at 40.
40. MARSHALL & JAGGERS, supra note 24.
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Polity IV score greater than zero, as well as an XRCOMP component
score equal to three.
Several U.S. opponents were not scored by the Polity Project, or
were scored as governments in transition or "interregnum" periods, 41
thus, they cannot be conclusively labeled as "democracies" or "nondemocracies". 42 In order to determine whether these governments may
be considered democracies, they must be examined individually.
Two regimes, those of Cambodia in 1975 and Somalia in 19921994, were classified as "interregnum", meaning authority structures had
completely collapsed.43 Intuitively, "interregnum" governments cannot
be considered democracies.
The tribal governments of the Marquesas in 1813 and Johanns
Island in 1851 were too small to be scored by the Polity Project. They
may well have employed some democratic structures, but the information
available is insufficient to thoroughly analyze them for purposes of
classification as either autocracies or democracies. Neither was likely a
true democracy in the sense of having contested elections and civil
liberties.4a
During the two Barbary Wars in 1801-1805 and again in 1815,
Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis were part of the Ottoman Empire. While the
regimes in these cities had significant control over their small regions,
these regimes were ultimately responsible to the greater Ottoman
Empire, which was not a democracy at the time. Likewise, in 1867,
Formosa was formally a part of China, though China was not exerting
full control. Formosa certainly had some government structures of its
own, but being by and large beholden to China, it cannot be considered a
democracy.
Serbia was in a state of transition in 1919. Prior to World War I,
Serbia scored a "4" on the Polity index; 45 following World War I Serbia
became part of Yugoslavia, which scored a "0" on the Polity index.46
41. Id.
42. The U.S. opponents that did not receive a conclusive Polity score include: the
governments of Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis during the Barbary Wars; the tribal
government of the Marquesas in 1813; the government of Johanns Island in 1851; the
government of Formosa in 1867; the government of Serbia in 1919; Mexico in 1914;
Cambodia in 1975; the PLO in 1982-84; and Somalia in 1992-94.
43. MARSHALL & JAGGERS, supra note 24.
44. I base this contention on the premise that tribalism as a government structure is
primitive and simple, in the sense that the central authority and the community are more
closely linked than in more complex polities. See 1 S.E. FINER, THE HISTORY OF
GOVERNMENT 61 (1997). On the contrary, liberal democratic policies are highly complex
in their requirement of the right to vote, contested elections, an executive accountable to
an elected legislature, etc. as defined previously in this paper.
45.

MARSHALL & JAGGERS, supra note 24.

46.

Id.
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Thus, Serbia in 1919 cannot be considered a democracy.
Finally, the Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") was not
considered an "independent state" from 1982 to 1984, so it did not
receive a Polity IV score. Certainly the PLO employed some democratic
institutions, including providing its "citizens" with the right to vote. But,
were the elections fair and competitive? One scholar of the democratic
peace proposition, James Lee Ray, observed that the competitiveness of
elections is demonstrated in practice by the actual replacement of
government leaders.4 7 Under this standard, the PLO cannot properly be
considered to have competitive elections, as Yasser Arafat has been the
chief executive since 1969. And while he remains responsible to the
people, any restrictions on his decisions are much more based on the
need to maintain a political base and international backing than any
formalized government structures. Thus the PLO cannot be considered'a
true democracy.
The U.S. used force against two regimes that received an overall
Polity IV score greater than zero. These regimes were Korea in 1871,
which received an overall Polity IV score of "l," and Germany in 1899,
which also received an overall Polity IV score of "1." Neither of these
governments scored a "3" on the XRCOMP component, which indicates
that neither government was considered to have competitive elections.
Not incidentally, U.S. involvement in both of these incidents should
be characterized as defensive. In 1871, Korean forts opened fire on a
U.S. naval ship in Korean waters while a negotiating team was pursuing
a diplomatic resolution to a prior incident in which Koreans burned a
U.S. merchant ship and killed its crew. Under armed attack, the U.S.
returned fire on the Korean forts. Similarly, the 1899 Samoan conflict
was preceded by an earlier conflict in 1888-1889, during which Germany
(then scoring a "-4" on the Polity IV scale) was battling to extend
control over the entirety of Samoa. The Samoans revolted, and the U.S.
and Britain went to aid in their defense. A hurricane destroyed most of
the fleets of Germany, Britain and the U.S., and the dispute was settled
with the 1889 Treaty of Berlin.4 8 In 1899, Samoa was embroiled in a
civil war following the death of its king. Germany chose sides in the
civil war and attempted to assert its authority over Samoa, this time in
violation of the 1889 treaty. Once again, the U.S. and Britain landed to
defend Samoa from the Germans and their Samoan allies.
47.

RUMMEL, supra note 4, at 40.

48. The 1889 Treaty of Berlin (Multilateral Neutrality and Autonomous Government
in Samoa (General Act of Berlin), June 14, 1889, 1889 U.S.T. LEXIS 10, 1 Bevans 116)
between Germany, Britain, and the United States achieved peace by recognizing Samoa's
independence and neutrality. Western Samoa, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, availableto

subscribers at http://www.britannica.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
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Thus, during the history of small interstate conflicts, the U.S has not
opposed another democracy as a belligerent. The basic democratic peace
proposition that democracies do not engage in armed conflict against
other democracies still holds true when analyzed in a small war setting.
The next step is to determine how and why the U.S. became involved in
these small interstate conflicts. Factors examined include whether the
U.S. was the aggressor in each conflict, and if so, whether its actions
were motivated by value extension or value conservation. I also assess
whether the actions taken by the U.S. were legal according to postCharter international standards. Finally, I analyze such factors as
balance of power and likelihood of escalation of the conflict.
Of the thirty-two small wars identified in the data set, six did not
rise to the level of aggression, but rather were demonstrations or displays
of force in which the U.S. threatened but did not actually use military
force. 49 For these six instances, it is not possible to accurately determine
which party to the conflict was the initiator, since neither party was the
aggressor according to the definition used. That leaves twenty-six
incidents in which an aggressor could be clearly identified. The U.S.
was the aggressor in seven of the conflicts. 50 A non-democracy was the
aggressor in eighteen of the conflicts. One conflict has been identified as
a case of mutual aggression. 51 Thus, the U.S. was more than twice as
likely to be the object of aggression than to be the aggressor.
Of the twenty-six small interstate wars in which an aggressor could
be identified, the aggression was for purposes of value extension ten
times and for purposes of value conservation seventeen times. 52 The
U.S. was aggressive for purposes of value extension only once. That
instance was in 1914 against Mexico regarding Veracruz, discussed at
length below. That means the U.S. aggression was for purposes of value
conservation seven times, including the case of mutual aggression. Thus,
when the U.S. was the aggressor, it was much more likely to be
49. These six incidents include: the 1851 and 1858-59 Turkey demonstrations
following the use of force against foreigners; the display of force in Paraguay in 1859
following an attack on a naval vessel in the Parana River; the 1864 show of force to
compel Japan to comply with existing trade agreements; the display of force in Haiti in
1888 to persuade the Haitian government to give up a seized American steamer; and a
demonstration in Morocco in 1904 to secure the release of a kidnapped American.
50. These seven instances in which the U.S. was the aggressor include: the Falkland
Islands attack in 1831-32; the conflict with Nicaragua in 1854; the Arrow War in China
in 1856; the Veracruz incident in 1866; the Formosa reparations in 1871; the Mayaguez
incident in Cambodia in 1975, and the Libyan missile exchange in 1989.
51. The case of mutual aggression was in 1918 Mexico, along the U.S. - Mexico
border at Nogales.
52. I have scored the case of mutual aggression as for purposes of value
conservation, and have counted it twice - once for U.S. aggression and once for Mexican
aggression.
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motivated by value conservation than by value extension. On the other
hand, non-democracies were aggressive for purposes of value extension
nine times, and were aggressive for purposes of value conservation ten
times. Thus it seems that non-democracies were just as likely to commit
aggression for purposes of value extension as they were for purposes of
value conservation.
The lone instance of U.S. aggression for purposes of value
extension was when the U.S. took Veracruz and held it for seven months.
Outraged at the brutal methods employed by Huerta to oust Madera, the
U.S. wanted to prevent a German shipment from reaching the Hueristas.
Rather than intercept the ship on the high seas, the U.S. decided to seize
the destination port of Veracruz. In the ensuing battle, twenty-two
Americans and at least 126 Mexicans were killed. The U.S. was clearly
the aggressor in this conflict. The aggression could be considered to
have been for purposes of value extension, since the ultimate goal of the
U.S. was to overthrow a dictator and extend democratic institutions to
the Mexican people.53 Of course it should be noted that the U.S. was
responding to outrageous behavior by Huerta, and was thus responding
to a perceived wrongdoing by the Mexican government.
It is now useful to examine whether the U.S. acted in a method that
would be considered legal according to post-Charter standards of
international law. The data set indicates that in thirteen of thirty-two
instances, the U.S. actions were illegal. Six of those instances were the
demonstrations or displays of force mentioned above, six were the
instances of U.S. aggression, and one was an instance of mutual
aggression. In one conflict, Libya in 1989, the U.S. was identified as the
aggressor, but its actions have been coded as legal. Each of these is
discussed in greater detail below.
Section 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits "the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."54 A display of force is, by its nature, a threat
of force against the territorial integrity of another state. In each of the six
demonstrations by the U.S., the U.S. was responding to an illegal (though
not necessarily aggressive) action by the other state. One of the displays
of force was to urge Japan in 1864 to comply with existing trade
agreements. Twice the U.S. demonstrated against Turkey's massacre of
foreigners (including Americans), in 1851 and again in 1858-59.
Paraguay attacked a U.S. (non-military) naval vessel in the Parana River
in 1859, Haiti had seized an American steamer in 1888, and Morocco
had kidnapped an American citizen in 1904. Each of these incidents

53.
54.

BOOT, supra note 17, at 150-155.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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occurred prior to the existence of the UN Charter, at a period in time
when customary international law allowed the use of force by a state to
protect the lives and property of its citizens abroad.55 These incidents did
not even involve the use of force, but rather the mere threat of the use of
force. By today's standards the demonstrations of force would be
considered to be illegal; at the time the U.S. was acting fully within the
law.
As previously noted, the U.S. was the aggressor in seven of the
small wars identified in the data set. Five of these incidents are properly
classified as reprisals. A reprisal is the use of force against another state
that has violated international law, with the purpose to encourage that
state to conform to the law.56 Most scholars believe that the UN Charter
prohibits reprisals. 5 7 But many scholars believe otherwise, and more are
beginning to rethink this view. 58 Reprisals were legal under customary
international law, provided three requirements were met: the state
against whom the reprisal is directed acted illegally, the state performing
the reprisal has given the other state an opportunity to make reparations,
and the ultimate response is proportionate to the illegal act originally
committed. 59 I have coded each reprisal as illegal according to postCharter international standards since the U.S. has been identified as the
aggressor. This warrants further consideration, though.
Each of the five reprisals was directed against states that illegally
targeted private U.S. citizens or merchant interests. As such, they cannot
be strictly construed as "the use of armed force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence" of the U.S. 6 0 Certainly this
interpretation is debatable, but to simplify my analysis, I have opted for a
strict interpretation. Therefore, the U.S. was the aggressor in each
instance. It is a worthwhile exercise, though, to determine whether each
reprisal would have been illegal when undertaken.
The first U.S. reprisal occurred against Argentina in the Falkland
Islands in 1831-1832. At the time, Argentina laid claim to and
established a settlement on the Falkland Islands. The Falkland Islands
settlers were committing piracy and had illegally captured three U.S.
merchant ships. The crew of the USS Lexington was sent to investigate
55.

Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self Help Under International Law, in 62 U.S.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, 129, 134-37 (Richard Lillich and
John Norton Moore eds., 1980), reprintedin NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 147 (John Norton

Moore,
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

et al. eds., 1990).
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134-36.
Id.
Id. at 131.
U.N. Resolution, supra note 28.
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the charges of piracy. After finding what he considered to be proof of
the piracy, the commander of the USS Lexington made prisoners of
essentially the entire population (some forty persons) of the Falkland
Islands, as all were considered to be engaged in piracy. The piracy was
clearly illegal, and the settlers were given the opportunity to release the
ships and make reparations. The detainees were later handed over to the
Argentine government in Buenos Aires. The U.S. response does not
seem disproportionate, so the reprisal was likely legal under customary
international law.
The second reprisal by the U.S. was against Johanns Island in 1851.
I have been unable to find significant information on this incident, other
than the fact that U.S. forces exacted redress for the unlawful
imprisonment of an American whaling ship. Thus, the actions of
Johanns Island were illegal. I am unaware of any specific opportunity
afforded to Johanns Island to apologize or make repairs for any injury.
The final requirement for a reprisal to be legal under customary
international law is that it be proportionate to the initial illegal action.
After several U.S. reprisals, including the Falkland Islands incident
discussed above and the Nicaraguan incident discussed next, public
outcry ensued, a likely indication of a disproportionate response. There
is no record of public outcry following the Johanns Island reprisal,
indicating that the response by the U.S. was likely proportional. Thus,,
this reprisal would have been legal under customary international law.
In 1854, the U.S. exacted reprisal against Nicaragua. A band of
Nicaraguans took charge of a neighboring town, and soon began
harassing a U.S. trading post, committing violence against American
citizens and destroying property. They even assaulted a U.S. Minister
visiting the town. Their actions were clearly illegal. The U.S. provided
several opportunities for the Nicaraguans to apologize and repair the
injuries. Ultimately, the sloop of war Cyane fired upon the town, but
only after providing a warning to the townspeople so they would have
Such a response seems
the opportunity to safely escape harm.
proportional, and, therefore, legal under customary international law.
The next reprisal occurred in 1867 against Formosa after the crew
of a wrecked American merchant vessel was murdered there. Such
action was clearly illegal. I was unable to find sufficient information to
determine whether ample opportunity was afforded Formosa to make
amends. The U.S. ultimately responded by landing crews from the USS
Hartford and the USS Wyoming, who proceeded to bum some of the
natives' huts. This response may or may not have been proportional,
depending on the diplomatic efforts employed to secure appropriate
apologies and assurances that similar events would not occur in the
future. As with the Johanns Island reprisal, the actions against Formosa
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were likely proportional, since no public outrage was recorded, and very
little information is available regarding the reprisal. Thus, this use of
force was also likely legal under customary international law.
One hundred years passed before the next (and last) reprisal
discussed. In 1975, the Khmer Rouge seized the U.S. merchant ship SS
Mayaguez. Cambodia's arrest of the SS Mayaguez was illegal because it
was passing through international waters en route to Thailand from Hong
Kong. Diplomatic efforts to secure the safe return of the ship and its
crew were unsuccessful. Cambodia was given ample opportunity to
make reparations, but failed to do so. U.S. marines were sent to rescue
the ship, but as they landed on Cambodian soil, the Cambodians fired
upon them. The response by the U.S. of sending marines to rescue the
ship and its crew was proportional. Combat ensued only after the
Cambodians opened fire.
This incident was the most difficult to code. Cambodia's arrest of
the Mayaguez was not strictly aggression, since the Mayaguez was a
merchant ship. Certainly, Cambodia fired first against the U.S., but I
opted to code the U.S. landing on Cambodian soil as the first act of
aggression. The landing of U.S. marines constitutes the use of force
against the territorial integrity of another state. This characterization is
definitely debatable, but I believe it is conservative. My overall findings
indicate that the U.S. is less aggressive than non-democracies in small
war settings, so any questionable incidents coded as U.S. aggression will
not undermine my conclusion.
It is worth pointing out that the Mayaguez incident is the first U.S.
reprisal in the post-Charter era. The Mayaguez incident has been coded
as an illegal reprisal under UN Charter standards, but could also be
viewed as defensive. U.S. marines entered Cambodian territory not to
engage in armed conflict, but to secure the safe return of U.S. property
and citizens. The episode did not turn into armed conflict until the
Cambodians fired upon the marines. As a defensive action, the
Mayaguez incident could feasibly be scored as legal under post-Charter
standards. I have chosen not to code this reprisal as legal, though, as all
evidence indicates that the U.S. was prepared to exact redress against
Cambodia, but was fired upon before it had the chance.
Each of the reprisals engaged in by the U.S., viewed strictly, could
be considered illegal under current-day standards of international law.
The first four of the five reprisals occurred prior to the adoption of the
UN Charter, and would have been viewed as legal at the time under
customary international law. The only post-Charter reprisal (The
Mayaguez incident) could be analyzed under the alternate legal concept
of defense, but it is still likely illegal according to post-Charter standards.
The Veracruz conflict in 1914 is the sixth incidence of U.S.
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aggression. This conflict was discussed above.
The final incidence of U.S. aggression, which was not coded as
illegal, occurred in 1989 against Libya. Over the previous decade, the
U.S. and Libya had exchanged hostile fire on several occasions. On each
prior occasion, Libya fired first against U.S. jets, creating an armed
attack that justified a return of fire under UN Charter Article 51 selfdefense provisions. On the 1989 occasion, though, Libyan jets had
merely demonstrated hostile intentions when the U.S. responded with
hostile fire. Libya's threats were illegal according to UN Charter Article
61
2, which prohibits "the threat or use of force" against another State.
But the Definition of Aggression Resolution identifies as the aggressor
the State that first uses armed force against another.62 A demonstration
of hostile intentions does not involve the use of force, so the U.S.
response of firing upon the Libyan jet constituted the first use of force.
Thus, the U.S. is properly characterized as the aggressor.
The Libyan incident could also be analyzed in the context of
anticipatory self-defense. Customary international law provides for the
right of defense when danger is imminent.63 Scholars have mixed views
as to whether a right of anticipatory self-defense is encompassed under
UN Charter Article 5 1.64 The general view, though, is that some
situations of "anticipated" or "imminent" or "impending" attack can
realistically be regarded as an "armed attack" for purposes of UN Charter
Article 5 1.65 Libya's demonstration of hostile intent, combined with the
ongoing nature of the attacks over the previous decade provided
sufficient reason to believe that Libya would make good on its threats. If
any situations could be viewed as so imminent as to be regarded as an
"armed attack" for purposes of Article 51, surely this incident could. So,
while aggression is viewed as violating the UN Charter, the Libyan
incident is quite likely legal not only under customary international law,
but also as a proper, legal defensive action under Article 51.
Of the thirty-two small wars analyzed, there was one conflict coded
as mutual aggression. It occurred at Nogales, Mexico, along the U.S.Mexico border in 1918. At that time, intelligence reports indicated a
significant threat of attack on the U.S. by Mexicans instigated by
German agents. Many U.S. troops were moving out for war in Europe,
61. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
62.
U.N. Resolution, supra note 28.
63. Myres McDougal & Florentino Feliciano, Conditions and the Expectation of
Necessity, in LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 231-41 (1961), reprinted in
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 105 (John Norton Moore, et al. eds., 1990).
64. Id.
65. Amos Shapira, The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defense, in 2 THE ARABISRAELI CONFLICT 205, 214 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974), reprinted in NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 162 (John Norton Moore, et al. eds., 1990).
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but a few were left behind to defend against a border attack. Mexican
troops appeared to be gathering at the border, digging trenches and
moving supplies into town. On August 27 th, a man attempted to walk
through the guarded international gate. When the U.S. Customs official
tried to stop him, the man kept moving. U.S. personnel followed the
man across the border, and were immediately fired upon by Mexican
troops. This started the Battle of Nogales. While the Mexican troops
fired the first shot, the rising tensions over the weeks preceding the battle
and the hostile movements by the U.S. troops provide for a more difficult
identification of aggressor. For this reason, I have labeled this conflict as
a case of mutual aggression.
In every case of U.S. aggression, the U.S. had significantly greater
military strength and experience than its opponent. To lower the
likelihood that the conflict would escalate into war, many conflicts, such
as the reprisals and demonstrations, were intentionally at a low level of
intensity. In no situation did the U.S. have cause for serious doubts
regarding the outcome of its aggression.
In the remaining eighteen small wars, the U.S. participation was
legal by today's standards. Nine were for purposes of self-defense,66 and
of collective defense.67 Three were sanctioned by
six were for purposes
68
the United Nations.

66. These nine include: the quasi-war with France between 1789 and 1800 in which
French pirates and, indeed, the French government were committing acts of piracy and
aggression against U.S. interests; the Barbary Wars of 1801-1805, in which the
governments of Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis directed acts of piracy against U.S. ships; the
Barbary War of 1815, which began when Algiers declared war on the United States; the
Arrow War in China in 1856, which commenced when China fired upon a U.S. naval
ship; the Japan conflict of 1863 when Japan attacked a U.S. naval ship; conflict in China
in 1866 which began when China assaulted an American consul at Newchwang; the 1871
conflict with Korea discussed previously; the first Libyan missile exchange in 1981,
when Libya fired a heat-seeking missile; and the Libyan missile exchange in 1986, when
Libya again fired at U.S. jets.
67. The six incidents of collective defense include: the conflict in the Marquesas in
1813, in which a neighboring tribe attacked a tribe that was assisting in the repair of a
U.S. naval vessel; the 1888 conflict in Samoa, in which the U.S. embarked to assist
Samoa in its revolt against German aggression; the 1899 conflict in Samoa, when the
U.S. again assisted Samoa in its battle against German aggression; the 1919 Italy/Serb
border dispute, in which the U.S. assisted Italy in defending against Serb attacks during a
border dispute; Operation Golden Pheasant in Honduras between 1983 and 1989, during
which U.S. troops stood ready to fight against Nicaraguan incursions into Honduras; and
the Tanker War of 1987-88, during which the U.S. military protected Kuwaiti oil tankers.
68. The three conflicts sanctioned by the UN include: Lebanon in 1982-1984, when
troops sent to act as a deterrent while Syrian, Israeli and Palestinian forces withdrew from
Lebanon were fired upon by Palestinian and Syrian factions; Operation Restore Hope in
1992-1994 Somalia, when troops intervened for humanitarian purposes and were later
fired upon; and the Bosnian conflict of 1985, when troops were attacked after the U.S.
and E.C. recognized Bosnia's independence.
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Civil Conflicts
In the data set for civil conflicts, I have identified eighteen distinct
conflicts that were primarily domestic in nature prior to U.S.
involvement. The UN Charter prohibits intervention in civil wars, since
aid to one side might violate the political independence of the State and
the right of its people to determine their own political future.69 UN
Charter 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against the political
independence of any State, but there are instances in which a State's
intervention in the domestic activities of another State is not directed
against the political independence of that State, and thus does not violate
the UN Charter. The existence of such circumstances is most apparent
when the host country consents to the other State's intervention.7 °
To determine whether the U.S. has acted in accordance with postCharter international legal standards, it is useful to determine whether the
U.S. in fact received consent to intervene in another country's domestic
conflicts. But who has the authority to provide such consent, and is that
authority diminished once the regime is embroiled in a domestic power
struggle? The status of the existing government structure indicated in the
data sets is a useful factor in determining whether a particular regime has
sufficient authority to provide consent to foreign intervention in a
domestic conflict.
Aside from the question of consent, most States view as permissible
military aid to an incumbent government, but view aid to insurgents as a
violation of the Charter's non-intervention principle, even where the
insurgents portray themselves as freedom fighters. 71 This is to be
distinguished from a "national liberation movement" that is aimed at
toppling colonial or foreign government rule, discussed below.72
Turning to the analysis of the eighteen conflicts, I first note that in
no instance was the U.S. opposing another democracy. On three
occasions (Lebanon in 1958, the Philippines in 1989 and Haiti in 199495), the U.S. intervened to assist a democracy in power. In six of the
eighteen incidents, the U.S. did not choose sides, but rather intervened
for the purpose of establishing order in a country rife with civil strife.7 3
69. Wippman, supra note 35, at 209.
70. Id.
71. Id. at213.
72. Captain Benjamin P. Dean, Self-Determination and U.S. Support of Insurgents:
A Policy-Analysis Model, 122 MIL. L. REV. 149, 184-85 (1988).
73. The six conflicts in which the U.S. intervened, but not as a belligerent on one
side or the other include: Matamoras in 1866; the Cuban revolution from 1906-1909;
insurrection in Haiti from 1915-1934 (though ultimately the U.S. defended itself against
rebel attacks, the initial involvement was not in support of either side); the revolution in
Honduras in 1919 (it has been argued that the U.S. provided tacit approval for the
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The U.S. received consent in ten of the eighteen conflicts. In an
additional situation, consent was provided, then withdrawn prior to the
commencement of military activities. In seven of the conflicts, no
consent was offered. In order to determine whether the U.S. was acting
within the legal limits, we must examine the consent question to identify
whether the party offering consent had sufficient authority to do so.
Even where consent was not provided, the U.S. did not necessarily
violate international law, as noted in more detail below.
An established government provided consent in three of the
eighteen conflicts. 74 An established government clearly has authority to
authorize foreign intervention in a domestic dispute. Thus, U.S.
intervention in the domestic upheaval in these countries was legal under
the Charter framework based upon this consent.
The U.S. received consent to intervene from regimes in equilibrium
with their adversaries in four of the eighteen identified conflicts.75 In
practice, States are slow to withdraw recognition from an incumbent
government.76
As a result, States tend to afford the incumbent
government broad rights to seek assistance from third parties in
suppressing threats to its authority.77 This is especially true where the
incumbent government does not appear to be in imminent danger of
collapse, and where the government may plausibly allege that significant
external assistance has been provided to its opposition.7 8
In 1906, the Cuban government was in equilibrium. The then
governor, Tomds Estrada Palmer, asked the U.S. for assistance in
repelling a coup, thus granting consent for U.S. intervention. Rather than
provide military support, the U.S. sent a mediator to broker a settlement
between the opposing factions. Before a deal could be reached, though,
Estrada Palmer resigned from office. The U.S. then felt compelled to
intervene until a new government could be established, and at that point
sent military troops who were able to advance unopposed. The
mediation attempt by the U.S. was certainly legal, as the U.S. had
removal of the government leader, but the U.S. was not insistent on its chosen leader
gaining control); the revolution in Nicaragua from 1926-1933 (as in Haiti from 19151934, the U.S. ultimately defended itself against rebel attacks, but the initial involvement
was not in support of one belligerent or another); and in Macedonia from 1993-94.
74. The three instances when an established government provided consent include:
the nationalist revolution in Egypt in 1882; the Philippines coup attempt in 1989; and the
instability in Macedonia in 1993-94.
75. The four situations in which the U.S. received consent from a government in
equilibrium with its adversaries include: the Cuban revolution in 1906-09; the
Nicaraguan revolution from 1912-25; a threatened insurrection in Lebanon in 1958; and
Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti from 1994-95.
76. Wippman, supra note 36, at 223.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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received consent from an established government not apparently in
danger of collapse. But by the time the U.S. sent troops, the government
was not in clear control, and was definitely in danger of collapse. There
was no allegation that the opposition was receiving external assistance.
Thus, the military intervention by the U.S. into the domestic affairs of
Cuba was not legal according to post-Charter international standards.
Similarly, the U.S. intervention in the Nicaraguan revolution
between 1912 and 1925 was unlawful. President Adolfo Diaz of
Nicaragua had not been in power long, and he was threatened by a
rebellion. By the time he requested help from the U.S., the rebels held
the capital city. There was never an allegation of external assistance to
the rebels. Thus, the U.S. had received consent from a government in
jeopardy of collapse, with no allegation of a prior unlawful intervention.
The U.S. intervention was not legal.
On the other hand, U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958 was legal,
as was intervention in Haiti in 1994-95. In Lebanon, the existing
government was threatened by a growing insurrection allegedly backed
by The United Arab Republic. In Haiti, the U.S. received consent from
the recognized executive, albeit after he was ousted by a coup. But the
legitimacy of the intervention in this instance lies less with the consent
than with the UN authorization received pursuant to Chapter VII of the
Charter.
The U.S. received consent from a government comprised of one or
more warring factions in two instances: the revolution of 1919 in
Honduras, and the 1965 civil war in the Dominican Republic. In general,
when a government is comprised of warring factions, justifications other
than consent need to be sought for intervention to be considered legal.7 9
Possible justifications include authorization from a regional organization
and consent from each of the warring factions.8 °
Between 1911 and 1920, the government of Honduras was unstable,
with rival factions vying for control. In 1919, two factions were lining
up international support for their causes. The U.S., determined not to let
the domestic conflict escalate to the international arena, offered to
mediate a settlement. Both sides agreed, fearing that declining the U.S.'s
offer would lead to open intervention. An interim government was
established, and elections, albeit manipulated elections, were eventually
held. This intervention by the U.S. was legal because it had support from
each of the warring factions.
In 1965, civil war broke out in the Dominican Republic. Since
1961, the government had been unstable, with rival factions competing
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
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for power. The U.S., increasingly concerned with the Communist
sentiment expressed by several of these factions, was anxious to monitor
the situation closely. The U.S. ultimately intervened to restore order,
protect American citizens in the Dominican Republic, and prevent the
spread of Communism. The Organization of American States (OAS)
participated in what came to be known as the Inter-American Peace
Force (IAPF). Thus, the U.S. intervention into the Dominican Republic
had the approval of a regional organization, and was therefore legal.
In the final conflict in which the U.S. received consent, the
government was in a state of complete collapse. That conflict was in
Grenada, and the year was 1983. Grenada's Governor-General Sir Paul
Scoon invited U.S. intervention, but consent does not carry much weight
when all government structures have essentially collapsed. In instances
such as this, authority to approve military intervention falls with regional
organizations. 8 1 Even with this approval, a temporary absence of
government is not likely to be sufficient legal grounds under the U.N.
Charter, because the political forces within the country must be given a
chance to reestablish order. 82 External intervention with regional
approval is legal only after a prolonged state of anarchy.83 In Grenada,
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) authorized U.S.
intervention, but the anarchy in Grenada was not prolonged. In fact,
anarchy had reigned for only twelve days when the U.S. landed in
Grenada. Admittedly, the quantification of "prolonged" is debatable, but
clearly the political forces within Grenada could not realistically be
expected to establish order in only twelve days. Thus, even with OECS
approval, the U.S. intervention in Grenada was not legal. The U.N.
provides one more justification for legal intervention when government
structure is in complete collapse, though. Regional peacekeeping that is
not directed against the government but rather that is focused on
restoring order and orderly process of self-determination is permissible.8 4
Unfortunately, the U.S. motivation for intervention was to prevent a
Marxist faction from gaining control. The U.S. intervention in Grenada
was not lawful.
One of the eighteen instances of civil conflict involved a case of
withdrawn consent. In a revolution in the Dominican Republic from
1916-1924, President Juan Isidro Jiminez of the Dominican Republic
was ousted, and he requested U.S. assistance to restore him to power.
82.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 231.
Id. at 233.
Id.
John Norton Moore, Grenadaand the InternationalDouble Standard,78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 145, 153-59 (1984), reprinted in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW at 181 (John Norton
Moore, et al. eds., 1990).
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When it was determined that the only way to restore his authority was
through the use of force, Jiminez resigned, declining to use military force
against his people and essentially withdrawing consent. The U.S.
proceeded anyway. If an intervention is to be justified by consent of the
government, then that intervention must fall within the guidelines of that
consent. 85 Any intervening activities outside the scope of the consent
cannot be lawfully justified. U.S. intervention would not likely have
been lawful even with valid consent since the government was in
equilibrium; the President had already lost his stronghold, and there was
no allegation of foreign backing to the rebels.
In the remaining seven civil conflicts, the U.S. did not receive
consent to its intervention. In five of these seven conflicts, 86 the U.S.
actions were considered illegal. But in two of the conflicts, the U.S.
interventions were legal despite the absence of host government consent.
The first of these was Panama's struggle for independence from
Colombia. The Colombian government was an established government,
but since the U.S. was siding with the Panamanians, consent clearly was
not granted. Nevertheless, such a battle for independence would be
considered a national liberation movement, which is deemed permissible
by the UN, provided the movement is aimed at liberating a country from
colonial domination or occupation by foreign forces.87 Such was the
case in the struggle for Panama's independence.
Thus the U.S.
intervention was legal despite the lack of consent from the Colombian
authorities.
The second conflict in which consent was not granted yet
intervention was lawful was in Kosovo in 1998. The Kosovars, too,
were fighting for independence. Their fight was against Yugoslavia.
The basis for lawful intervention could be the national liberation
movement argument, but an even stronger basis here is the authorization
and participation by NATO forces, as regional peacekeeper.
It should be remembered that, while half of the interventions could
not be scored as legal interventions according to post-Charter standards
of international law, most of them occurred in the pre-Charter era. While
the UN reserves the right to intervene whenever there is a threat to or
breach of international peace, 88 that body did not exist prior to 1945.
85. Wippman, supra note 36, at 234.
86. The five conflicts in which consent was not provided and therefore U.S.
intervention was not lawful include: the holding of Matamoras, Mexico for three days in
1866; U.S. assistance to rebels in Nicaragua in 1909-1910; U.S. asserting control over
Haiti from 1915-1934; U.S. asserting control over Nicaragua from 1926-1933; and
Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1988-89, during which the U.S. intervened to oust
Noriega.
87. Dean, supra note 73, at 184-85.
88.

U.N. CHARTER Chapter VII.
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Prior to establishment of the UN, individual States felt an obligation to
unilaterally assume the role of international peacekeeper. As a result,
some of the conflicts scored in the data set as illegal action by the U.S.
may have been legal had a regional organization or the UN itself been
given the opportunity to analyze the situation and determine whether
intervention was justified to restore international peace. Examples of
potentially lawful interventions include the instances of Matamoras in
1866, Haiti in 1915-1934, and Nicaragua in 1926-1933, when the U.S.
intervened to restore order rather than to participate as a belligerent.
As in the interstate conflicts, in each of the eighteen instances of
U.S. intervention into the civil conflicts of another State, the U.S. had by
far the stronger and more experienced military. The U.S. was not in fear
of losing any of the actions it undertook.
Interventionsfor Protection
In addition to the U.S. military involvement in the thirty-two
interstate and eighteen domestic conflicts noted above, the U.S sent
troops a total of eighty-eight times throughout its history to protect its
citizens or property in foreign lands. The purpose of these interventions
was not to engage in conflict or to interfere with the domestic politics of
the host country, but rather to serve as a deterrent to military activities
aimed at U.S. citizens or property abroad. As such, the U.S. neither
threatened nor used force against another State, and certainly did not do
so against another democracy.
Under customary international law, a State may legally use force to
protect lives and property of citizens abroad; however this right is not
granted under the Charter.89 Some scholars argue that protective action
falls under the realm of self-defense, asserting that injury to the nationals
of a State constitutes injury to the State itself. 90 However, under both
customary international law and the self-defense argument, certain
conditions must be met before the protective action is considered lawful.
The threat to nationals must be genuine, imminent and substantial. 9' The
host country government must have failed to protect those threatened
within its borders. 92 The purpose of the military mission must be limited
93
to rescuing or protecting those nationals whose lives are in danger.
89. Lillich,supra note 56, at 147-48.
90. Nikolai Krylov, HumanitarianIntervention: Pros and Cons, 17 LOy. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 365, 377 (1995).
91. Christopher C. Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness ofInvasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L
L. 131, 134-35 (1984), reprintedin NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 184 (John Norton Moore, et
al. eds., 1990).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Finally, the protective military action must not be directed against the
authority structure of the government. 94 The eighty-eight protection
actions listed in the Interventions for Protection data set meet these
requirements, and may thus be considered lawful.
While the U.S. sent military troops in these eighty-eight conflicts, it
did not anticipate actually using force in any of them. The nature of the
intervention was such that the conflict was not likely to escalate to the
use of force.
Aside from these eighty-eight protective actions, it is interesting to
95
think of the reprisals mentioned above as interventions for protection.
Certainly in each of those instances, a genuine and imminent threat to
U.S. nationals existed, and the host country had failed to protect them.
In only one of the reprisals was the U.S. action limited to rescuing or
protecting its nationals, as opposed to punishing or threatening force in
the event of future harm to its nationals. That reprisal was the Mayaguez
incident. While I believe there is a sound argument to be made for
analyzing the Mayaguez incident as an intervention for protection, I have
opted to analyze it as a reprisal, because, in addition to rescuing the crew
of the Mayaguez, navy jets were instructed to fire upon military
installments on Cambodia's mainland. In fact, Cambodia fired upon the
U.S. first, but evidence indicates the U.S. intention was reprisal rather
than merely protective action.
Conclusion
Since gaining its independence, the U.S. has sent military troops
abroad to participate in small wars in some form or fashion a total of 138
times. In not one of these conflicts did the U.S. threaten or use force
against another democracy. When force was used or threatened, the U.S.
actions were, more often than not, legal according to post-Charter
standards of international law. Frequently, even when the actions would
not have been considered to be legal according to modern standards, they
had been considered legal at the time they occurred.
In over 60% of the small wars, the U.S. did not threaten force or
anticipate needing to use force. When the U.S. illegally threatened or
used force, it was most likely to do so in low-intensity settings that were
not likely to rouse a call to arms. In all of its aggressive actions, the U.S.
was far more experienced in military matters than its opponent, which
acted as a deterrent to escalation of the conflict. This seeming avoidance

94. Id.
95. As a reminder, those reprisals include the Falkland Islands in 1831-1832,
Johanns Island in 1851, Nicaragua in 1854, Formosa in 1867, and the Mayaguez incident
in 1875.
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of an increased use of force may be indicative of the U.S.'s aversion to
violence.
That being said, U.S. actions were illegal according to post-Charter
international standards in over 15% of the small wars identified. In civil
conflicts, the U.S. was just as likely to intervene when such action was
considered illegal as when the host-country or an international
peacekeeping organization properly authorized it. The U.S. did not seem
to think twice about threatening force or using low-level violence to right
an actual or perceived wrongdoing.
While this data and analysis supports the broader democratic peace
proposition, it also indicates that the U.S. is more prone to violence and
aggression in small war settings than in the major war settings described
by numerous scholars, especially when confident it can achieve its goals
without risking escalation of the conflict.
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Appendix A
The Data Sets

Data Set for Interstate Conflicts

IHIM

II 9aj 1Il
Ul
•

-

- I I lo l
Sa

H-

l

1J
-|

-

-

.

342

[Vol. 22:2

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

Data Set for Civil Conflicts

-

-

2.
2

a2

....

2

*2

E~

Za

E

,E

°i
,2=2-

K,

;;

2

_2

,

2

2

&I2

Eo

ZE
E E'

e

2

Ei

2
22

2225

2003] DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION: U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SMALL WARS

343

Data Set for Interventions for Protection
Beginning

ending

Year

Year

1833

1833

Argentine insurrection

Conflict

Argentina

1835
1852

1836
1853

Peru
Argentina

1853

1853

Peran
re:olution
Argentine revo~lution
Political disturbances in
Nicaragua

Nicaragua

-5

1854

1854

Chinese ciAl strife

China

-6

1855

1855

Shanghai

China

-6

1855
1856
1858
1859

1855
1856
1858
1859

Attempted revolution
Panama insurrection
MonteAdo insurrection
Shanghai

Uruguay
Columbia
Uruguay
China

-3
2
-3
-6

1860

1860

-77,0

1860
1865

Revolution in Panama
Protecting Interests in
Angola
Revolution in Panama

Columbia

1860
1865
1867

1867

Managua and Leon

Nicaragua

-5

1868

1868

Uruguay

-3

1868

1868

MonteAdo insurrection
On the death of the
President

Columbia

8

1868

1868

Japan

I

1873
1876

1873
1876

Japanese
cisl strife
Panama - Columbia
hostilities
Matamoras

Columbia
Mexico

8
-88,-6

1885

1885

8

1888

Korea

1

1890

1890

Argentina

1

1891

1891

Revolutionary actiRty
Unsettled political
conditions
Protecting interests in
Argentina
Protect refugees from
Valparaiso

Columbia

1888

1891

1891

1894

1894

1894

1895

1894

1896

1894

1894

1895

1895

1896

18986

1898

1898

1898
1899

Location

Natives in Angola
Columbia

Reine
-88-5
-3
-88-4.-3

N/A
-5

Chile

3

Protecting interests in Haiti Haiti
Protecting interests in
Brazil
Brazil
Sino-Japanese
War
(China)
China
Sin.-Japanese
War
(Korea)
Kora
Protecting interests in
Nicaragua
Nicaragua

-3

Columbia

-3

Nicaragua

-5

Nicaragua

-5

1898
1899

Bandit attack
Protecting interests in
Nicaragua
Protecting interests in
Nicaragua
Protecting interests in
China
Insurrection in Nicaragua

China
Nicaragua

-6
-5

1901

1901

Revolutionary distrubances

Columbia

0

1902

1902

CiKil war

Columbia

0

1902

1902

Columbia

1903

1903

Protect transit lines
Protecting interests in the
Dominican Republic

1903

1903
1903

1904

1904

Reolutionary actidty
Local Moslem uprising
feared
Revolution in Dominican
Republic
Russo-Japanese
War

Honduras

1903

1904

1905

(Korea)

Korea

1907

1907

Honduras. Nicaragua

-86,-5

1911

1911

Honduras - Nicaragua War
Protecting interests in
China

China

-88,-2

1911

1911

Civil strife in

Honduras

Honduras

Dominican Republic

Syria
Dominican Republic

-3
-6
1
-5

0
-3
5
N/A
-3
1

5
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Data Set for Interventions for Protection (cont.)
Year
1912
1912
1912
1912
1913
1914

Conflict
Protect railroad in
Honduras
Protecting
interests
Cuba
Revolutionary
activity

Location
Honduras

RegIme
-66

in
Cuba
China

Balkan War
(Turkey)
Evacuate citizens
from
Mexico
Protecting interests
in
Haiti

3
2

Turkey
Mexico

-1
-77.0

Haiti

-3

Insurrection in the
1914
1916
1917
1922
1919
1920
1920
1922
1922
1923
1924
1924
1925
1925
1925
1926

Dominican
Republic
Nanking
Chungking
Insurrection In Cuba
Greek
occupation
of
Constantinople

Dominican Republic
China
China
Cuba

Civil strife in Guatemala
Kiukiang
Protecting interests
Rusia
Protecting interests
Turkey

Guatemala
China

-9
-5

Russia

-1

in
Turkey

-77.0

China

-5

in
Honduras

-66

China
China

-5
-5

in
Honduras

5

Panama

-3

China

-5

China

-5

in

1932

Hankow. Kiukiang
Nanking. Shanghai,
Tientsin
Japanese
occupation
Shanghai

1934

Foochow

1948

Palestine

1949

1927

-66

in

Chinese unrest
Political disturbances
Honduras
Shanghai
Shanghai
Political
upheaval
Honduras
Strikes
and riots
Panama

Turkey

-66
-5
-5
-66.3

of
China

-5

China

-5

China

-5

China

-9

1960

Nanking and Shanghai
Evacuation from
Tachen
islands
Evacuation during
Suez
Crisis
Evacuation during Cuban
Crisis

1974

Evacuation from Cyprus

Cyprus

1976
1980

Evacuation from Lebanon Lebanon
Iran Hostage Crisis
Iran

1990
1992

Evacuation
from
Liberia
Evacuation from Sierra
Leone

1994

Evacuation

1996

Evacuation from Liberia
Evacuation
from Central
Africal Republic

Liberia

Evacuation from
Evacuation from
and Gabon
Evacuation from
Leone
Protecting interests
Cambodia
Protecting interests
Liberia
Evacuation from
Bissau

Albania

1955
1956

1996
1997
1997
1997
1997
1999
1999

from Rwanda

Albania
Congo

Egypt

-7

Cuba

-77,0; -88-4

Liberia

10
-77.0
-99-2
-77,0

Sierra Leone

-7

Rwanda

-6
-88.0

Central Africal Republic

Congo and Gabon

6
5
-77.0; -4

Sierra
Sierra Leone

-77,0

in
Cambodia

-7

in
Liberia

0

GuineaGuinea-Bissau

-77.0

2003] DEMOCRATIC

INTERVENTION: U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SMALL WARS

345

Appendix B
Database Bibliography: Bibliography for the Data Sets
Jonah Begone and Mal Stylo, McDougal and the Wyoming or,
Before There Was Pearl Harbor, There Was Shimonoseki, at
http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/1422/wyoming.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2002).
MAX BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE (2002).
Bosnia

and

Herzegovina, in

ENCYCLOPAEDIA

BRITANNICA,

availableat http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=414538 (last visited Nov.
22, 2002).
George Bush, Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on United States Military
Assistance to the Philippines (Dec. 2, 1989), available at
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1989/89120201.html (last visited Jan.
2003).
13,
Photius Coutsoukis, Honduras: The Threat of Renewed Instability,
1919-1924 (2001), available at http://workmall.com/wfb2001/honduras/
(last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
Department of Public Information, United Nations, Completed
at
Operations,
Peacekeeping
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co-mission/co miss.htm#top (last
visited Nov. 6, 2002).
FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
THAILAND: A COUNTRY STUDY (Barbara Leitch LePoer, ed. 1987),
at
available
(last
http://www.geocities.com/Tokyo/Garden/2011/thaihistory.html
visited Jan. 9, 2003).
Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network,
United States Military Operations, at http://www.fas.org/man/dod101/ops/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
[conflict-specific information]
James P. Finley, The Buffalo Soldiers at Fort Huachuca, vol. 2

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:2

ILLUSTRATED
(1996),
available
http://www.ku.edu/-kansite/wwone/comment/huachuca/H12-06.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
HUACHUCA

at

Salvador E. Gomez, The U.S. Invasion of the Dominican Republic:
1965,
SINCRONIA,
Spring
1997,
at
http://fuentes.csh.udg.mx/CUCSH/Sincronia/spring.html (last visited Jan.
3, 2004).
Tatyana Gordeeva, Imperial Germany (German Culture 19982002),
at
http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/history/bl-imperial-germany.h
tm (last visited Jan. 7, 2003).
Anthony Gray and Maxwell Manwaring, Panama: Operation Just
Cause
(Institute
for
National
Strategic
Studies),
at
http://www.ndu.edu/insslbooks/books%20%201998/Policing%20the%2ONew%20World%20Disorder/o20%20May%2098/chapter2.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
Christine Gray, Host-State consent and United Nations
Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 241 (1996).
Richard F. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Armed
Forces Abroad, 1798-1999, Congressional Research Service, The
Library
of
Congress
(May
17,
1999),
available at
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30172.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
RICHARD N. HAASs, INTERVENTION, THE USE OF AMERICAN
MILITARY FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (rev. ed.., The

Brookings Institution 1999).
Haiti,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
available
at
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu= 127853 (last visited Jan. 9,
2003).
History of Egypt
(InterCity
Oz,
Inc.
1996),
http://www.touregypt.net/ehistory.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2003).

at

History of Honduras (Emulate
Me
1997-2003),
at
http://www.countryreports.org/history/honduhist.htm (last visited Jan. 9,
2003).

2003] DEMOCRATIC

INTERVENTION: U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SMALL WARS

347

History of U.S.Interventions in Latin America (Marc Becker, ed.),
at http://www2.truman.edu/-marc/resources/interventions.html
updated March 1999).

(last

Daniel M. Jones, et al., MilitarizedInterstate Disputes, 1816-1992:
Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns, 15 CONFLICT MGMT
&
PEACE
SCI.
163
(1996),
" available
at
http://www.umich.edu/-cowproj/dataset.html#MID (last visited Jan. 2,
2004).
WILLIAM EVERETT KANE, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, CIVIL STRIFE IN LATIN AMERICA: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S.

INVOLVEMENT (1972).

John H. Kelly, Conference Report, U.S. and Russian Policymaking
with Respect to the Use of Force, Chapter 6 (Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil
A.
Payin,
eds.,
1996),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF 129 (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
Tore Kjeilen, Palestine Liberation Organization, ENCYCLOPEDIA
(LexicOrient 1996-2003), at http://i-cias.com/e.o/plo.htm

OF THE ORIENT

(last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
WALTER LAFEBER, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS: VOLUME 2, THE AMERICAN SEARCH FOR

OPPORTUNITY 1865-1913 (Warren I. Cohen, ed., 1993).
WALTER LAFEBER, INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS

(1983).

[conflict-

specific information]

A. P. AMERICAN HISTORY TEXTBOOK, Ch. 6 (Starr,
Yu,
Lynch,
&
Weinstein,
eds.,
1999),
at
http://mciunix.mciu.kl 2.pa.us/-udhsweb/aphistory/book6.html
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2002).
PETER LYNCH,

Mexico, history of, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, available at
http://www.britannica.com!eb/article?eu=115538 (last visited Jan. 7,
2003).
MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, INTEGRATED NETWORK
FOR SOCIETAL CONFLICT RESEARCH PROGRAM, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, UNIV.

OF

MD.,

POLITY

IV

PROJECT

(2002),

available

at

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:2

http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity (last visited Jan. 3, 2004).
National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, Lewis and
1800-1810,
at
Post
Expedition
Clark
Timeline,
http://www.nps.gov/jeff/LewisClark2/Timelines/PostExpedition/1800to 1
810.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
Operation Black Flag, The Mayaguez Incident, available at
http://members.tripod.corn/-GranzowMissingLinks/POWMIA.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2002).
John Rodgers, Report of Rear Admiral John Rodgers, Detailing the
Events Leading Up to the U.S. Assault of the Korean Forts (Thomas
Duvernay, ed., 2002), available at http://www.shinmiyangyo.org (last
visited Jan. 3, 2004).
SHERIDAN, 2 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF P. H.
available at http://www.simonova.net/library/812-3.html
(last visited Jan. 7, 2003).
PHILIP
SHERIDAN,

HENRY

U.S. Maritime Service Veterans, Capture and Release of SS
Mayaguez by Khmer Rouge Forces in May 1975 (1998-2002), at
http://www.usmm.org/mayaguez.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2002).
USS Duncan (DDR 874) Crew and Reunion Association, Official
USS
Duncan
Reunion
Association
Website
2001,
at
http://www.ussduncan.org/silas-page l3.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2003).
David F. Winkler, Marine Amphibious Landing in Korea, 1871, 42
POWER
no.
11
(November
1999),
available at
http://koreaweb.ws/pipermail/koreanstudieskoreaweb.ws/2000May/002652.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002).
SEA

World
Statesmen (Benjamin
Cahoon, ed.,
2002),
http://www.worldstatesmen.org (last updated Nov. 5, 2002).

at

